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A lithium-ion battery explosion during routine maintenance paralyzed 647 government systems, raising urgent questions about disaster recovery preparedness and single points of failure
A catastrophic fire at South Korea's National Information Resources Service (NIRS) data center has disrupted hundreds of critical government services for nearly a week, exposing fundamental weaknesses in disaster recovery architecture that should alarm enterprise IT leaders worldwide. The incident, which began with a lithium-ion battery explosion during what should have been routine maintenance, has left only 85 of 647 affected systems operational as of Tuesday morning, with full recovery now projected to take up to four weeks.
The incident underscores three critical enterprise risks: over-centralization of infrastructure, inadequate failover capabilities, and the growing fire hazards associated with lithium-ion UPS systems—a technology increasingly adopted by data centers for its space and efficiency advantages.
The Incident Timeline
On Friday, September 26, at 8:20 PM local time, workers at the NIRS facility in Daejeon were relocating uninterruptible power supply (UPS) batteries from the fifth-floor server room to the basement—a safety measure implemented following a similar incident at a SK C&C data center in 2022. The relocation, ironically intended to reduce fire risk by separating batteries from servers, triggered a thermal runaway event when a lithium-ion battery exploded approximately 40 minutes after power was disconnected.
The resulting fire required 170 firefighters and 63 fire trucks to contain, taking 22 hours to fully extinguish. All 384 lithium-ion batteries in the UPS system were destroyed, along with 96 critical IT systems. One worker sustained first-degree burns.
The fire's intensity and duration stemmed from the fundamental challenge of lithium-ion battery fires: thermal runaway can reach temperatures exceeding 1,000°C and resists conventional firefighting methods. Firefighters avoided using water initially due to concerns about damaging data, instead relying on carbon dioxide suppression systems—a decision that prolonged the incident.
For enterprises operating in South Korea, the ripple effects have been significant. One industry ministry official reported having to book travel arrangements manually for a trade delegation, with authorization processes reverting to paper-based workflows. Citizens have been forced to visit physical offices for services normally completed online, and businesses dependent on government integration platforms like Bizinfo Plus (G4B) face operational disruptions.
The Single Point of Failure Problem
The NIRS operates three data center sites across Daejeon, Gwangju, and Daegu, housing approximately 1,600 government systems. However, over one-third of these systems—647 in total—were concentrated at the Daejeon headquarters. When the fire struck, all 647 systems went offline simultaneously.
The critical failure: lack of active-active redundancy. While the NIRS had backup facilities, they were not configured for real-time failover. Vice Interior Minister Kim Min-jae acknowledged that the absence of "twin server" architecture meant services could not automatically switch to backup locations during the outage.
This architectural decision proved catastrophic. Even President Lee Jae Myung expressed surprise that the government lacked better backup systems, particularly given a similar outage in November 2023. That earlier incident should have prompted implementation of active-active redundancy, where backup servers synchronize in real-time, enabling immediate failover.
The Lithium-Ion Battery Risk Factor
The NIRS fire is the latest in a troubling pattern of lithium-ion battery incidents in data centers:
October 2022: SK C&C data center fire in Pangyo disrupted KakaoTalk messaging platform, affecting millions of users. The incident led to CEO resignations and multiple lawsuits.
2018-2022: 55 UPS-related fires in South Korea alone
2017-2024: 55 energy storage system (ESS) fires reported by Korea Electrical Safety Corp.
Industry experts note that UPS systems often have simpler safety designs compared to large-scale energy storage systems. Unlike ESS installations with multiple layers of fire suppression, UPS batteries are frequently housed directly in racks or cabinets within data centers, with insufficient separation from critical infrastructure. At the NIRS facility, batteries were positioned just 60 centimeters from major servers—far too close given the risk profile.
The batteries involved were manufactured by LG Energy Solution and installed between 2012-2013. While they passed safety inspections as recently as June 2025, they had exceeded their 10-year lifespan, and replacement had been recommended. The fire appears to have started during the disconnection process, possibly due to human error in shutdown procedures—a voltage spike can occur if cables are disconnected without first ensuring power is fully shut off.
Recovery Progress and Challenges
As of Tuesday morning, September 30, authorities have restored 85 services, including high-priority systems like Gov.kr portal, Korea Post banking, and postal services. Recovery efforts prioritize "Grade 1" services—those deemed essential based on impact and user base—with 21 of 36 such services now operational.
However, the 96 directly damaged systems face a more protracted recovery. The government plans to relocate these to cloud infrastructure at the NIRS Daegu branch, a process now estimated to take four weeks—double the initial two-week projection. The revised timeline reflects the complexity of not just restoring systems, but rebuilding them in a geographically distributed architecture.
South Korea's government has already announced new measures: all large data centers will now face mandatory disaster management procedures including regular inspections and safety drills. The Ministry of Science and ICT is prioritizing development of lower-risk battery technologies—a matter of national interest for a country home to major battery manufacturers including Samsung SDI, LG Chem, and SK on.
The Bottom Line
The NIRS data center fire is not just a South Korean government problem—it's a wake-up call for enterprise IT worldwide. As organizations increasingly rely on lithium-ion batteries for UPS systems and consolidate infrastructure for efficiency, they must rigorously evaluate whether they've traded one form of risk for another.
The cost of the South Korean outage—measured in disrupted services, lost productivity, and damaged public trust—far exceeds whatever operational efficiencies were gained through centralization. For enterprise leaders, the message is clear: disaster recovery is not just about having backup systems, but ensuring those systems can actually function when primary infrastructure fails.
As the NIRS recovery stretches into its second week, IT executives would be wise to ask: if our primary data center went offline tonight, would we be measuring recovery in hours, days, or weeks? The answer to that question may determine whether your organization experiences a manageable incident or a reputation-defining catastrophe.
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