The US now openly acknowledges it has weapons in orbit to control space. As America, China and Russia race to militarise space, India must build indigenous space-defence capabilities, which have become a national security necessity.
Space becomes a battlefield
Outer space was once the domain of science, communications and peaceful exploration. Today it is fast becoming a theatre of geopolitical and military competition.
US Air Force Secretary Troy Meink has confirmed that the United States has operational on-orbit space-control capabilities. He gave no details on their design, location, number or timelines. The admission marks a fundamental shift: military power is no longer measured only on land, at sea, in the air and in cyberspace. The ability to protect, disrupt or control satellites is now central to national defence.
Satellites underpin modern warfare. They handle navigation, communications, missile warning, intelligence, surveillance and precision targeting. Disabling them can cripple an adversary.
America’s counter-space toolkit
Washington divides space-control capabilities into offensive and defensive systems, using both kinetic and non-kinetic means.
- Defensive: electronic countermeasures, satellite cybersecurity, manoeuvrable spacecraft, and systems that detect hostile activity in orbit.
- Non-kinetic: jamming, cyber operations and directed energy, which can disrupt a satellite without destroying it.
- Offensive: ground-launched anti-satellite missiles and co-orbital systems that can disable or damage enemy spacecraft.
The exact nature of the newly acknowledged US weapons remains classified, and technologies discussed in public should not be read as confirmed deployments. The Boeing-built X-37B, a reusable, autonomous spaceplane operated by the US Space Force, is a case in point. It speeds up testing by flying long missions and bringing hardware back to Earth, but its confirmed role is experimental, not offensive.
China and Russia raise the stakes
China and Russia both warn that orbital weapons threaten global stability, yet both are developing advanced counter-space technologies themselves.
China’s Shijian-21 has been observed towing another satellite into a higher orbit. That capability can serve satellite servicing and debris removal, but it could also be turned against enemy spacecraft. Beijing has also developed reusable experimental spacecraft, ground-based anti-satellite systems, and electronic warfare and tracking technologies.
Russia brings long experience in military space operations, electronic warfare and orbital surveillance. Its “inspector” satellites, which manoeuvre close to other spacecraft, have raised concerns about spying and possible attack. Its destructive anti-satellite test in November 2021 created a large cloud of debris. US officials have also alleged that Russia is working on a nuclear-armed anti-satellite capability, though no such deployment has been publicly verified.
The deeper problem is that tools built for inspection, servicing or defence can also serve as weapons, making intentions ever harder to read.
The risk of an orbital chain reaction
The fallout from conflict in space would reach far beyond the countries involved. Banking, telecom, aviation, shipping, weather forecasting, disaster management and internet connectivity all depend on satellites. An attack on key orbital assets could disrupt commerce across continents.
The gravest risk is Kessler Syndrome, a scenario in which debris from collisions sets off further collisions. A single kinetic strike can produce thousands of high-speed fragments that threaten satellites for years. A wider war using destructive anti-satellite weapons could damage the orbital environment the whole world depends on. Responsible behaviour, debris mitigation and international cooperation are therefore essential to global security.
India’s response: from Mission Shakti to space defence
In March 2019, India’s Mission Shakti destroyed a satellite in low Earth orbit with an indigenous missile. The test placed India among the few nations with proven anti-satellite capability. It also highlighted the tension between deterrence and keeping orbits usable.
Since then, DRDO, ISRO and the Defence Space Agency have expanded India’s military space infrastructure, including surveillance, electronic warfare and secure communications. ISRO’s NETRA (Network for Space Object Tracking and Analysis) improves India’s ability to track orbital objects and assess collision risks. That ability matters more as satellites, debris and manoeuvrable spacecraft multiply. India must also get better at spotting suspicious behaviour in orbit and responding to interference.
SBS-III: a ₹26,968 crore eye in the sky
India’s most ambitious military space programme is Space-Based Surveillance Phase III (SBS-III). Approved at about ₹26,968 crore, it plans 52 surveillance satellites, with 21 built by ISRO and 31 by private Indian industry. That split gives the domestic space sector a major opportunity.
The constellation is meant to strengthen monitoring of sensitive land borders, sea approaches and strategic regions. Depending on each satellite’s design, payloads could include electro-optical and radar imaging. Deployment is reported to stretch into the late 2020s, though launch dates await official confirmation. Once complete, SBS-III could become the backbone of India’s military space architecture and reduce reliance on foreign intelligence.
Cybersecurity: the overlooked front
Missiles grab headlines, but cyberattacks pose an equal threat. Satellites depend on onboard software, ground stations, communication links and data networks, and a breach in any of these could leak intelligence, cut communications, corrupt data or seize control of a spacecraft. Jamming and spoofing add further risk to navigation and military communications.
AI cuts both ways: it improves threat detection but also enables automated attacks and deception. India’s space security must therefore be built on cyber resilience, Zero Trust principles, encrypted communications, continuous authentication and AI-driven anomaly detection. As quantum computing advances, post-quantum cryptography will be vital for long-lived satellites. Protection must cover the entire ground-to-space chain, not just the spacecraft in orbit.
Autonomy with partnership
Deeper defence ties with the United States and other partners can improve space situational awareness, information sharing and technology collaboration. But partnerships cannot replace home-grown capability, and heavy dependence on foreign systems is a liability in a crisis. India must accelerate domestic research, advanced manufacturing, secure satellite communications, autonomous spacecraft and resilient ground infrastructure, with its fast-growing private space sector playing a central role. At the same time, it should keep backing international rules that keep space usable for all.
Deterrence without destruction
The US–China–Russia rivalry has made space central to military strategy. For India, the goal is not simply more satellites or a show of offensive power. It is a resilient, secure and self-reliant space ecosystem.
True space power will be measured by the ability to protect orbital assets, keep operations running and deter aggression without triggering destructive escalation. That requires stronger surveillance, secure communications, robust cybersecurity, rapid threat detection, indigenous technology and close coordination between civilian and military agencies.
The aim should not be to turn space into another battlefield. It should be to keep India’s national security, digital economy and strategic sovereignty safe in an increasingly weaponised orbit. Space is no longer just the final frontier of exploration. It is now a defining frontier of security, sovereignty and global stability.
